Guest post by Drieu Godefridi
On 24 February 2022, Russian armies swept across Ukrainian territory. Trump’s election heralds a new approach to the Ukraine issue. Perhaps now is a good time to revisit the background to this sordid war.
The maximalist enlargement of NATO, a “tragic mistake”?
When the USSR collapsed, two schools of thought emerged in the West. The messianic school of those who believe that the Western model of liberal democracy is destined to extend its influence.
From this point of view, welcoming a former Soviet country into NATO is tantamount to allowing it to embrace civilisation, by removing it from the authoritarian Russian orb.
In contrast to the messianics, the American realist school of George F. Kennan and Henry Kissinger believes that international relations involve a search for a balance of power. Kissinger and Kennan do not deny the primacy of the West in terms of values; they ask that other conceptions and philosophies of power be taken into account. Especially if they are backed by the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.[1]
In the twilight of Mikhail Gorbachev’s term of office, Russia was in a comatose state, unable to stand up to its adversaries. When Germany announced its reunification, Russia decided not to oppose it. But it asked for guarantees.
On 9 February 1990, US Secretary of State James A. Baker and Soviet leader Gorbachev agreed in Moscow that NATO would not extend beyond East Germany.
This pledge — “iron-clad guarantees that NATO jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward,” in the words of Becker — was publicly confirmed by NATO’s Secretary General Manfred Wörner in May 1990.
Although this commitment is not a formal treaty, it is clear and categorical. Because, the concept of Russian imperialism had not changed.
The Russians remained convinced that NATO threatens their vital interests and that a buffer zone between NATO forces in Europe and Russian territory is a necessity. They want guarantees.
Five years later, NATO’s enlargement towards Russia began. With Russia in a weak position, the Americans thought they could disregard the moral ‘soft law’ commitment they had made in 1990.
NATO began to expand eastwards, accepting countries and states that had previously formed an integral part of the Russian orbit. The decision to expand towards the countries of Eastern Europe in successive waves was taken by the Clinton administration in the mid-1990s.
The first invitations: at the Madrid summit (1997), NATO invited three countries to begin accession talks: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In March 1999, these three countries officially joined NATO at the Washington summit.
In 1999, President Clinton expressed the ‘messianic’ philosophy of this enlargement in no uncertain terms: “We want all of Europe to have what America helped build in Western Europe – a community that upholds common standards of human rights, where people have the confidence and security to invest in the future, where nations cooperate to make war unthinkable.
That is why I have pushed hard for NATO’s enlargement and why we must keep NATO’s doors open to new democratic members, so that other nations will have an incentive to deepen their democracies.”
George Kennan had denounced this “tragic mistake” of this enlargement in the New York Times in 1998. He explained that by counting on Russian weakness, we were overlooking the fact that this asthenia would not last forever, and that the Russian concept of security had not changed.
Enlargement will nevertheless continue as far as the Baltic States, in 2004; States that were Russian for a long time and where a significant proportion of the population was (is) Russian-speaking and ethnically Slavic.
Ukraine
Emboldened by its past successes, NATO, like the turkey that rejoices in being fattened up – “so far, so good” – until Thanksgiving, affirmed in 2008 its desire to welcome Ukraine into its fold.
Ukraine is obviously more complicated than the three modest Baltic states. A thousand-year-old cradle of Russian civilisation — ‘Kievan Rus’ was the first East Slavic state and later an amalgam of principalities in Eastern Europe from the late 9th to the mid-13th century — Ukraine was almost always an integral part of Russia, until the Bear – the Soviets, in this case – granted it a form of independence.
A formidable agricultural power, Ukraine is the largest territory in Europe and the indispensable stepping stone for any movement of troops from Europe to Russia (Napoleon 1812, Hitler 1941) and from Russia to Europe (Stalin 1943, 1944).
That Ukraine, its country and its people, are intimately linked to Russia is a simple fact. To deny this for propaganda purposes is not the act of a knowledgeable person, but of a militant (equally respectable, but different). Moreover, territorial conflicts are not decided by morality or history, but by diplomacy and force – two forms of the same reality: power.
When Ukraine’s NATO vocation was affirmed in 2008, the Russians choked. Not just Putin; as Bob Woodward points out in his latest book War (October 2024), he has never met a Russian – not even one of Putin’s fiercest opponents – who accepts the idea of Ukraine joining NATO.
Armies of Russian and Western spies, manipulators and provocateurs immediately descend on Ukraine in an attempt to influence Ukrainian politics.
In 2014, Ukraine witnessed a major upheaval, often referred to as a “coup d’état”, although the term is open to debate and largely depends on the political and geopolitical perspective. Ukraine was torn between its communist past, an opening towards Europe, and its age-old ties with Russia.
The government of Viktor Yanukovych, the democratically elected president, rejected the association agreement with the European Union, opting instead to strengthen ties with Russia under pressure from Moscow and promises of financial support.
This decision triggered a wave of demonstrations, which swelled into a human tide in the squares of Kiev, particularly on the Maïdan Nezalezhnosti, Independence Square.
The demonstrators, self-proclaimed “Euromaidan”, called for an end to corruption and a reorientation towards Europe. The months that followed were marked by clashes, with the government responding by force to what it considered to be an insurrection.
Snipers, whose identity and motives remain controversial, fired into the crowd, killing dozens of demonstrators and police. These “Days of Dignity” (sic) marked a point of no return.
On 22 February 2014, in an atmosphere fraught with tension, the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, voted to remove Yanukovych from office. A new government was formed.
Western observers hailed this as a triumph of democracy, while Russia and its allies saw it as a coup d’état orchestrated by Western forces. Let us understand the Russian view: Moscow was playing the game of Western democracy and it is a democratically elected Ukrainian leader who had chosen rapprochement with Russia.
In response, the West is supporting what in legal theory is a coup d’état, to ensure Ukraine’s future membership of NATO.
It was in response to this blow that Russia seized Crimea and invested in the Donbass: initial incursions, but not yet war, because Russia does not have the military means.
The Georgian precedent
Russia had already invaded Georgia in August 2008, marking the start of the second South Ossetia war. This conflict was triggered by border clashes between the Russian-backed South Ossetian separatist militia and the Georgian armed forces.
Georgia attempted to reassert its control over South Ossetia, which led to a massive Russian military response, not only in South Ossetia but also in Abkhazia, another separatist region.
The war began on the night of 7 to 8 August 2008, when Georgian troops launched an offensive on Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, in response to attacks by South Ossetian militias.
Russia, under the pretext of protecting its population and guaranteeing peace, then intervened with its armed forces, pushing back the Georgian forces and taking control of South Ossetia and a large part of Abkhazia.
This conflict did not lead to the formal annexation of Georgia by Russia, but to Russia’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, regions which remain under de facto Russian and separatist control.
The invasion was a reaction to Georgia’s pro-Western orientation under President Mikheil Saakashvili, whose ambitions to join NATO and the European Union were perceived as threats to Russia’s strategic interests in the region.
The precedent was clear.
The war
In 2021, Russia is massing troops on the Ukrainian border, with deployments intensifying from November onwards. This military activity was initially interpreted as geopolitical pressure on Ukraine and the West.
But there was also Chekhov’s revolver theory: when a revolver is introduced in the first act, it’s because someone intends to use it. Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor to the US President, soon became convinced of this (see War).
However, many remained sceptical, particularly in Europe and even in Ukraine, whose leaders saw these gatherings of Russian troops as a means of exerting pressure rather than a threat of invasion.
In mid-January 2022, the American intelligence community unanimously concluded that a Russian invasion was imminent. Contacts were made at the highest level – that of the Presidency – to try to dissuade Putin, by presenting him with the detestable and deleterious consequences of an invasion for Russia.
In the course of these negotiations, the Russian point of view became did not change, demanding official and public recognition that Ukraine would never join NATO.
The Americans refuse to provide this guarantee.
On 22 February 2022, Russian troops entered Ukraine, opening a trail of carnage that continues to this day.
Provisional balance sheet
NATO’s enlargement towards Russia, in contravention of the 1990 commitments, is the decisive cause of the war in Ukraine — which in no way excuses Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
Denying the reality of this commitment, denying the reality of the pro-Western coup of 2014, is not a matter of knowledge, but of propaganda, which has nothing to envy to the Russian propaganda absurdly presenting Ukraine as a “Nazi state”.
The conflict between Western messianism and Russian imperialism will be settled by force of arms. Three years after the invasion of Ukraine, the Russians have taken a serious option on Eastern Ukraine. It is hard to see what geopolitical and military configuration would allow the Donbass, let alone Crimea, to return to the Ukrainian fold.
Three scenarios to end the war
The accession to power of the team that is in many respects qualitative that President Trump is preparing allows us to glimpse the end of this terrible carnage. Because we must avoid concluding too quickly, three scenarios are emerging:
Ukraine’s capitulation
Russia could still win a decisive military victory leading to Ukraine’s capitulation. This scenario depends on several factors such as a significant reduction in Western support, Ukraine’s inability to hold the front line any longer, and renewed and overwhelming military pressure from Russia.
This would suppose that the ceasefire negotiations drag on and that Russia bets on an “all-in” in the meantime. This scenario does not seem the most likely.
Frozen conflict
In this second scenario, American pressure would lead to negotiations aimed at a ceasefire rather than a complete resolution of the conflict, which is unrealistic at this stage.
A peace deal could indeed be reached if both sides, faced with exhausted resources and troops, decide to negotiate in good faith. This deal could include territorial concessions from Ukraine, security guarantees for Russia and Ukraine, and perhaps even the beginnings of Ukraine’s integration into international structures such as the EU.
With Ukraine’s accession to NATO being the original casus belli according to Russia, such a concession seems all the less likely given Russia’s advantage on the ground, despite its terrible losses in men and equipment.
According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russia has gained almost six times as much territory in 2024 as it did in 2023.
Escalation and external intervention
President Biden’s approval of long-range Ukrainian strikes into Russia marks a significant escalation of the conflict. This approval is not without reason, as it allows Ukraine to extricate itself from an increasingly critical situation on the front lines.
In response, Russian President Putin immediately signed a decree expanding the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, explicitly specifying that the use of ballistic missiles against Russia could justify a nuclear response.
Putin made it clear that aggression against Russia by a non-nuclear state, but with the support or participation of a nuclear state (a clear reference to Ukraine and its Western allies), could be considered a joint attack, potentially justifying a nuclear response. This sounds more like a warning than a direct nuclear threat.
The second scenario seems the most likely, although neither of the other two – capitulation or escalation – can be totally ruled out.
The post Roots of Conflict: The Secret History of the War in Ukraine appeared first on The Gateway Pundit.