Four years after Burma’s military coup, an unlikely revolution is defying the odds. Across the country, loosely organized People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), many of them underfunded, poorly equipped, and lacking formal military training, are steadily seizing ground from a powerful, well-armed army.
The junta’s forces boast modern weaponry, aircraft, and support from both Russia and China, yet it is the grassroots resistance, armed with homemade weapons and driven by determination, now control 70% or more of the country’s territory.
Recent battlefield reports from early July 2025 reveal a conflict where improvisation, local knowledge, and a population galvanized against a common enemy are proving more decisive than advanced weaponry and formal military doctrine.
Despite a 2025 defense budget of $5 billion and access to advanced military hardware, Burma’s military junta is steadily losing control over large parts of the country.
“We had two .22s, two M-16s, and a shotgun when we went into battle the first time,” recalled a PDF commander, describing the early days after the coup. That meager arsenal was meant to arm an entire unit of about 20 fighters.
Over time, the PDFs began capturing weapons from junta forces. They also taught themselves how to manufacture improvised bombs and even drones, gradually leveling the battlefield.
The decentralized resistance movement in Burma has increasingly relied on improvised weapons and persistent, coordinated attacks to strike at the junta’s most fortified positions.
In late June, the “Chindwin Rocket Brothers” PDF used entirely homemade missiles to devastate the junta’s northwest regional command headquarters in Monywa, Sagaing Region, killing 22 personnel, destroying a fuel depot, and setting multiple facilities ablaze.
The strike demonstrated how grassroots engineering can effectively challenge conventional military infrastructure. Just weeks earlier, the same target had been hit by the Brave Warriors for Myanmar (BWM), a largely Chin ethnic resistance group, using 107 mm shock missiles.
In January, BWM, alongside the Mountain Knight Civilian Defense Forces and the Anti-Coup People’s Liberation Force, also led a coordinated rocket attack on junta facilities in Loikaw, Kayah State, during a visit by junta deputy Lt. Gen. Soe Win for Kayah State Day.
The groups fired seven rockets at the State Hall and a military command center to send a clear message: even top junta leaders are not beyond their reach.
No casualties were confirmed in the Loikaw attack, but the pattern of resistance operations underscores an evolving strategy of sustained pressure through local coordination and improvised firepower.
The PDFs have developed sophisticated operational capabilities despite their guerilla origins. In Mandalay Region, PDF forces demonstrated remarkable tactical coordination when they ambushed a 100-strong junta supply convoy.
Beginning with a sniper’s precision shot that eliminated the commander, the attack escalated into a devastating assault using rocket-propelled grenades and concentrated gunfire.
The result: 30 junta troops killed, four captured alive, substantial weapons seized, and two of five transport vehicles appropriated.
Perhaps most striking is the PDFs’ ability to manufacture effective weapons from limited resources.
They have developed local production capabilities for rockets, missiles, and other ordnance that have proven highly effective against conventional military targets. During the middle years of the coup, homemade drones gave the resistance a tactical edge.
But that advantage has faded as the junta now receives large numbers of advanced drones from Russia and China and employs drone jammers to neutralize resistance UAVs. However, these jammers are useless against missile and rocket attacks, making the PDFs’ primitive, improvised weapons in some cases harder to counter than modern systems.
As resistance forces have gained ground, it has become increasingly difficult for the junta to resupply its troops. In Sagaing Region, where PDFs control most roads, the military has been forced to rely on river transport, a costly and vulnerable alternative.
On June 28, an attempted resupply mission via the Chindwin River turned into a running battle when multiple PDF units positioned along the riverbanks attacked the convoy with grenades and rifle fire.
A similar situation is unfolding in Karen State, where resistance forces have seized territory along the river all the way to the Thai border. Now, only resistance forces and the Thai military can access Karen territory by river. This control has allowed the resistance to resupply more easily and generate income through cross-border trade.
These gains reflect the PDFs’ evolution from disorganized protest groups into capable military forces able to deny terrain and limit junta movement.
In much of the country, junta troops are confined to their bases, major cities, and state capitals, while resistance forces control the rural and mountainous regions. For the military, resupply by air is often the only viable option.
Despite these setbacks, the junta still maintains absolute air superiority, as the resistance has no aircraft.
According to David Eubank, head of Free Burma Rangers, who has operated in the conflict for over 25 years, the junta cannot move by land except in brigade-sized formations, and only under air cover. Without it, they risk being ambushed by resistance fighters.
Despite their decentralized structure, PDF units have shown remarkable coordination with established ethnic armed organizations.
Recently, the Mon State Monsters PDF, operating under Karen National Liberation Army guidance, successfully overran a junta battalion camp in just 45 minutes. These hybrid formations blend conventional tactics with guerrilla warfare, creating a multi-layered challenge for junta forces.
The PDFs and resistance forces sustain heavy losses on an ongoing basis, yet they continue to recruit and operate, demonstrating a deep well of popular support.
Still, despite significant territorial gains, the end of the war remains elusive. In many cases, after sacrificing lives in hard-fought battles to seize ground, the resistance is forced to relinquish that territory, not for lack of will, but due to insufficient ammunition and supplies to hold it.
Most of the junta’s remaining strongholds are in urban areas, where resistance forces are less effective.
These positions are heavily fortified with landmines, drones, aircraft, and artillery, making them extremely difficult to capture.
Unless military support from Russia and China is cut off, the civil war, which began in 1948, could continue for many more years.
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