The Trump administration’s actions over the past few weeks have eliminated two of China’s primary sources of cheap oil, Venezuela and Iran. The administration has also effectively cut off oil to China’s friend, Cuba.
The Trump administration began pressuring Panama in 2025 to reduce Chinese influence around the canal, and in early 2026 Panama’s Supreme Court ruled that the concession held by a Hong Kong company to operate ports at either end of the Panama Canal was unconstitutional, leading the government to take control of the facilities.
With these moves, the administration has dealt more economic damage to China than any previous president. At the same time, China’s lack of response underscores how much more powerful the United States is diplomatically, militarily, and economically.
China’s refusal to aid Iran or take any significant stand for Venezuela or Cuba has proven that its only interest in its so-called “friends” is to make lopsided trade and investment agreements with them. The notion that China will support or protect the countries in its axis has been proven false.
China responded cautiously to the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, first expressing concern and calling for dialogue before condemning the attacks. Despite strong rhetoric, Beijing showed no intention of intervening directly.
This restrained response reflects China’s broader foreign-policy approach, which favors diplomatic statements and economic engagement rather than military involvement in distant conflicts. While Beijing can criticize U.S. actions diplomatically, it lacks the ability to deter or significantly shape U.S. and Israeli military operations.
China’s economic relationship with the United States is far more important to Beijing than its ties with Iran, particularly as both sides prepare for a meeting between President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping scheduled for later this month. Chinese leaders are unlikely to risk further tension with Washington over Iran, although they may engage in rhetorical disputes.
Any military assistance to Iran would likely remain limited to existing agreements involving technical cooperation and training, as Beijing seeks to avoid direct confrontation with the United States and its allies.
At the same time, there are reports that the CCP is working through private and state-owned companies to provide imaging to Iran to track U.S. troop movements. This has been kept quiet and is the sort of thing President Trump should confront Chinese leader Xi Jinping with at their summit because Beijing values stability and uninterrupted trade and investment more than military engagements.
China has about a 100-day reserve of oil and can supplement its needs by trading with Russia. However, the loss of cheap Iranian and Venezuelan oil should mean that China will be buying more oil on global markets at market prices, driving up China’s production costs and eating into its profits on exports.
About half of the 17 million barrels of crude oil China consumes each day comes from the Middle East. The greater risk would come from instability in the broader Middle East, especially if the Strait of Hormuz or regional gas facilities were affected.
Disruption to China’s oil supplies poses a particular threat to its military, which needs a dependable supply of gasoline and diesel to operate. As one analyst noted, “A military cannot run on coal or renewables.”
In addition to threatening China’s military without firing a shot, President Trump has also reduced the return on some of China’s biggest investments to possibly zero if the regime in Iran changes. Under its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing had established two overland routes to transport Iranian oil to China. One was the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the other was the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). CPEC alone has cost over $62 billion and is considered the flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative. Without cheap oil from Iran, neither project pays a dividend.
Beyond the economic and reputational costs to China, the Iran conflict will most likely delay a Taiwan invasion based on several factors. First, a Taiwan move would require the United States to fight on two fronts simultaneously, historically a scenario Washington has prepared for, not avoided.
Second, and more importantly, the Strait of Hormuz crisis directly threatens China’s own energy supply. China’s military would be attempting a major amphibious operation while its civilian and military fuel stocks are under stress from ongoing Middle East disruption.
Third, the precedent set by Khamenei’s assassination will drive Xi toward hardened survivability measures and caution. The United States has now demonstrated that it will kill the leader of a nuclear-adjacent state during active diplomatic negotiations, materially changing Xi’s personal security and command continuity calculus.
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